In this paper, I will reflect on the place of language within Michel Henry’s phenomenology. I will claim that Michel Henry’s position provokes an architectonic problem in his conception of phenomenology and I will discuss how he tried to solve it. At the end of the essay, I will try to clarify what I believe to be the ultimate root of that problem involving language.

El propósito que se guarda aquí es fijar una referencia real para el término «persona». Dicho con otras palabras, se trata de proponer un uso tal de ese término que en él venga a recogerse algo que sea concretamente patente. Ese propósito tiene, pues, un carácter fenomenológico, es decir, se trata de llevar al discurso algo fenoménicamente real.

En este ensayo se trata de pensar cómo tiene que asumirse la posibilidad de una evidencia significativa toda vez que a nuestro quehacer lingüístico parece ser inherente moverse en un horizonte de usos en el que estamos arraigados. Se trata además de pensar cómo lo anterior pueda condicionar la realización de un quehacer fenomenológico. Para ello, en primer lugar, se distinguirán con claridad dos fenómenos: la posibilidad de la evidencia significativa, de un lado, y el arraigo horizóntico inherente a nuestro (...) quehacer discursivo, de otro. Al hilo de una discusión con Husserl y Wittgenstein se trata, en un segundo momento, de considerar cómo ambos fenómenos puedan venir asumidos de una manera fenomenológicamente congruente. This paper reflects on how the possibility of meaningful evidence is to be assumed in view that all our linguistic exercises take place in the context of a discursive horizon where we are situated. To do this, the paper starts distinguishing two phenomena: first, the possibility of meaningful evidence and second, the horizontal character that is inherent to the deployment of linguistic meaning. Furthermore, through a discussion with Husserl and Wittgenstein, the paper considers how those two phenomena are to be consistently assumed within phenomenology. (shrink)

The main general goal of this paper is to consider in a new light what is usually referred in the phenomenological tradition as “material a priori”. Through a consideration of the evidence we have of anything colored being extended, the paper attempts to show that this evidence is of a different kind from the one we have of other propositions also involving necessity. The main peculiarity of this evidence is found in its dependence on linguistic meaning therein involved being rooted (...) in a factual world and on an imaginative process deployed on the background of that rooting. (shrink)

The article begins by considering Wittgenstein’s notion of family-resemblance concepts. The article purports to defend that there is something wrong with the idea that language is a family-resemblance concept, that is, that we take behaviour as being linguistic merely in virtue of undetermined similarities with paradigmatic linguistic behaviour. In order to achieve this goal, it is first clarified in which sense so-called psychological concepts are not family-resemblance concepts. The essential link between the use of the expressions “language” and “linguistic behaviour” (...) and the use of some expressions conveying psychological concepts, such as “saying something”, is then demonstrated. (shrink)

En este texto se cuestiona el modo como Michel Henry ha determinado la esencia originaria de la manifestación. Se explica por qué la manifestación no puede ser esencialmente determinada ni como inmanencia ni como trascendencia y se apunta el sentido que tiene ese concepto fenomenológico fundamental.

In this paper I will bring into consideration the controversy betweenHusserl and Natorp dealing with the accurate meaning of the psychological reflectionand, altogether with that issue, how the phenomenological activityshould be assumed. I will try to present the legitimacy of some of the criticswhich Natorp and Husserl make to each other. This will lead us to a pointwhere we will be confronted with a major problem which is posed on us: the elucidation of the concrete sense of the phenomenological activity.En (...) este artículo se considera someramente la controversia entre Husserl yNatorp relativa al sentido de la reflexión psicológica y, con ello, de la actividadfenomenológica. Trataré de presentar la legitimidad de las críticas que Husserly Natorp se hacen respectivamente. Eso llevará a indicar una tarea que sigueimponiéndosenos todavía: la dilucidación del concreto sentido del quehacerfenomenológico. (shrink)

After interpreting some of the passages in which Wittgenstein refers to phenomenology, this paper tries to clarify why Wittgenstein came to conclude that his work had to be ultimately understood in terms of phenomenology. Secondly, the paper discusses the phenomenological relevance of some of Wittgenstein’s views on language.

The main goal of this paper is to reflect on what characterizes the evidence of the propositions that we hold to be necessary. I have tried to show that the evidence of every necessarily true proposition takes the form of a self-contained operational composition. In conclusion, I will point out in what respects the view I defend might help to reconcile some traits of Husserl’s understanding of material a priori truth with some of the later Wittgenstein’s intuitions concerning linguistic meaning.